Abstract: Do people care about intentions? Good intentions often do not produce good results when a person tries to do something nice for someone else. In this paper, we ask under what circumstances do people pay attention to outcomes and under what circumstances do they focus on intentions. While the aphorism in the paper's title suggests that outcomes play a larger role than intentions, our study questions this assumption.
Even a dog knows the difference between
being stepped on and being tripped over.
--Oliver Wendell Holmes
Outcomes for any given situation often depend on a tricky combination of intentional effort and luck. To assess the importance of good intentions in the workplace, we ask: Under what circumstances do people pay attention to outcomes, and under what circumstances do they focus on intentions? Considerable evidence indicates that monetary reward is not the only motivation present among economic agents; social preferences such as altruism and reciprocity play roles as well. From Adam's (1965) classic equity theory to recent economic models of fairness in games, many social scientists have extended the assumption of self-interested preferences to include the idea that judgments and actions reflecting fairness are based on relative outcomes (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) .
However, the assumption that consequences matter but that processes do not has been challenged in many experiments (e.g., Charness, forthcoming; Offerman, 2002; Brandts and Solà, 2001; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, forthcoming and 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002;  Brandts and Charness, forthcoming). Models of kindness-based reciprocity offer perceived kindness or unkindness as the primary motivation for why people choose not to maximize their own material payoffs (see Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998) . The more recent models proposed by Falk and Fischbacher (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) enrich the outcome-based models by incorporating both perceived intentions and distributional concerns and reactions.
These distinctions occur in law, as suggested by the opening quote from Oliver Wendell Holmes and as argued by Huang (2000) . For example, manslaughter receives a lighter sentence than second-degree murder, which in turn receives a lighter sentence than first-degree murder.
All of these crimes result in a deceased victim, but they differ in the perpetrator's (perceived)
intentions.
more generous when the affected party has no choice in the process, 4 in which case such a comparison may not isolate the effect of perceived intention. In another approach, participants indicate contingent responses to each of a large number of feasible interim outcomes. While this methodology may seem innocuous, evidence indicates that a within-subject design often leads to different results than does the more standard between-subjects approach.
We provide a clean test of intention's influence in an experimental employment relationship by explicitly separating intentions from outcomes. Our study includes an element of chance in the wage-determination process and also permits workers to sacrifice to either help or hurt the firm. We permit a particular outcome to arise from either: (1) good intentions (a high wage costly to the firm) coupled with bad luck, or (2) less-good intentions (a less-costly low wage) coupled with good luck. If outcomes matter, the employees' responses should be similar regardless of how this situation arose. If intentions matter, employees should be more likely to work hard and less likely to sabotage the employer when the employer's intentions were good.
We find that the rates of punishment and reward are sensitive to both the wage selected by the employer and the amount actually received by the employee after Nature has intervened.
Despite identical wages and identical relative payoffs, responders' behaviors differ strongly.
Literature Review
While the standard neoclassical economic model assumes that people care only about maximizing their own payoffs, other social sciences have long considered the role played by social forces. In the past decade, these views have also become more prominent in economic theory. We first review evidence that relative payoffs matter and mention several economic models that build on this insight. We then present evidence for and models of cases where people care about the intentions of those who determine material payoffs, not just the payoffs themselves. We end this section with a review of models where own payoffs, relative payoffs, and intentions all play a role. Adams (1965) is concerned with equity---the fair share deserved by the constituent members of a group--as determined by the relative inputs of the group members. 5 Rent-sharing models from labor economics also express this view (at least implicitly), with workers and managers bargaining over a pie of quasi-rents. In such models, exogenously good or bad business conditions lead to high or low wages (Blanchflower, Oswald, and Garrett, 1990; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1998) .
Recent economic models of utility have included these insights. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) models assume that people like money but dislike inequality in material payoffs. Thus, agents may sacrifice their own payoff to reduce disparities in relative payoffs. The Fehr and Schmidt model also presumes that people who draw the short stick may dislike inequality more than those who draw the long one. The precise formulae for each model are in Appendix C.
Another related set of models assumes that people like to maximize total payoffs yet are particularly concerned about the level of the lowest payoff that any player receives. These models have substantial experimental support (e.g., Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1984, 1992;  Charness, forthcoming; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Kritikos and Bolle, 1999; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Charness and Rabin, 2002) . In the two-player games we study, concern about the lowest payoff is indistinguishable from concern about inequality.
People may also care about the process that led to payoffs, not just their own and others' material payoffs. Heider (1958) points out the importance of casual inference, where a person takes into account another actor's motive and situational constraints, as a cognitive process for perceiving social context. Gouldner (1960) argues that responses depend on the initial agent's perceived motives and free will.
A key issue is how people determine attributions for observed outcomes; often people will conflate outcomes and abilities. The fundamental attribution error reveals this (Ross, 1977) :
In many situations, people attribute more responsibility for outcomes to a person (rather than to a situation) than is warranted. Attribution theory considers a chain of events in which a person asks why an outcome occurred, assigns an attribution for the cause, and behaves accordingly (see Nisbett and Ross, 1980) . Many psychology experiments support this notion: Greenberg and Frisch (1972) find that help that is deliberately given leads to more reciprocity than does accidental help. 6 Blount (1995) finds that responders in an ultimatum game will accept a substantially lower proposal when it is generated randomly than when it is chosen by a selfinterested party. Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) provide economic models of kindness-based reciprocity as a motivation for sacrificing material payoffs. 7 The kindness of player i's choice with respect to player j reflects the highest material payoff available to player j given that choice, compared to the range of material payoffs feasible for player j after any choice by player i. In these models, one party considers the degree of kindness implicit in another party's choice and responds favorably to kindness (positive reciprocity) but negatively to unkindness (negative reciprocity). Beliefs about intentions play a central role in the kindnessbased models, with psychological game theory serving as the analytic tool (see Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1989 ).
More recently, models have combined kindness-based reciprocity and concern about relative payoffs. Falk and Fischbacher's (1999) model provides a role for intention and uses Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) inequity aversion as the distributional underpinning. Charness and Rabin (2002) present social payoffs as a weighted average of the total material payoffs for the reference group and the minimum material payoff of any member of the group. However, when one party misbehaves with respect to the social standard, the weight assigned to that individual's material payoff diminishes as others withdraw their concern for that party's welfare. The parties also display a taste for punishment, whereby one may sacrifice money to reduce the material payoff of a misbehaving party. 8 A number of experimental studies consider the issues of process and intention. Charness (forthcoming) conducts an experimental labor market in which the attribution for an assigned wage serves as the treatment variable. Workers provide costly effort (beneficial to the firm) even when a bingo-cage draw (rather than a self-interested firm). While no significant difference exists across treatments regarding worker behavior at high wages, a worker's response to a low wage depends on whether a self-interested firm intentionally chose the wage, reflecting negative reciprocity. 9 Offerman (2002) studies the effect of causal attribution in an experimental game in which a responder can sacrifice money to help or to hurt another party. In one treatment, a first mover intentionally chooses an action either favorable or unfavorable to the responder; in another treatment, this action is chosen through randomization. Offerman finds strong evidence of negative reciprocity and only much weaker evidence of positive reciprocity. However, both the Charness and Offerman studies face the methodological concern mentioned earlier: One party has no choice when there is exogenous determination. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000) test the role of intentions in a design where money may be passed to (and tripled) or taken away from a responder, who may then pass money to or take money from the other player. In one treatment, a self-interested first mover makes the initial choice; in the second treatment, a random draw causes the first choice. This study finds strong support for the role of intention; however, this study employs the within-subject strategy method with multiple options, so the results may raise questions.
Several other studies yield more equivocal or negative evidence about reciprocity. Bolton, Brandts, and Katok (2000) find no evidence of positive reciprocity. Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (1998) find no evidence of positive reciprocity and only statistically insignificant evidence of small levels of negative reciprocity. Cox (2000) and Cox and Deck (2001) provide mixed evidence regarding positive and negative reciprocity, and find that the results are sensitive to certain aspects of the experimental procedures employed.
Brandts and Charness (forthcoming) identify a per se reaction to deception, an important element of process, in a somewhat different manner. One player sends a message to the other player concerning his intended play in a subsequent 2x2 normal-form game to be played simultaneously; after an unfavorable sender play in the 2x2 game, the receiver can then choose to punish the sender. Two paths lead to the identical unfavorable outcome for the receiver: An unfavorable play by the sender can follow a deceptive message claiming the sender will make a favorable play, or it can follow a truthful message stating that the sender plans to make the unfavorable play. Punishment rates are twice as high following a deceptive message, so here the process clearly matters.
We extend this comparison of two volitional choices by combining an intentional choice with a random choice. We do not know of any previous study that uses this approach. Our approach permits comparisons across conditions and identical payoff contexts reached in different manners. In this way, we can control for distributional issues and isolate the role of intention in a clean test.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses

Experimental Design
Students at UC Berkeley and UC Santa Barbara served as participants in our experiments.
Participants in Treatment 1 were students in an introductory organizational behavior class, and participation was required for course credit. Participants in Treatment 2 were part of the normal experimental population, and we added a show-up fee of $5 to the payoffs earned in the session.
In each session, we placed students on separate sides of a large classroom to begin the experiment. They first completed surveys about business and pay practices and provided demographic information. After we collected these surveys, we proceeded with the experiment.
Each participant received a packet with surveys, instructions, and decision sheets, each marked with an identifying number used to track decisions. A total of 244 students participated in our eight sessions; each person could participate in only one session.
We flipped a coin to determine which side of the room would have the role of firms and which side would be workers. In our first treatment, each firm received $12 from which to pay a wage to a worker with whom he or she was randomly paired. The firm could choose to pay a low wage ($4) or a high wage ($8). The wage chosen was subtracted from the $12 endowment and assigned as an interim wage to the worker. Complete instructions are included in Appendix A.
We then established the nature of the business conditions. We flipped a coin in front of each worker to determine whether these were good or bad; firms were not allowed to observe the coin flips. We then either increased or decreased the wage randomly depending on whether business conditions were good or bad, with a 50 percent probability of each condition occurring.
All of this was common information.
Under good business conditions, the worker received $2 more than the firm initially chose to pay; under poor business conditions, the worker received $2 less than the firm initially chose to pay. Thus, following the coin toss, there were four possible interim outcomes: We performed the experiment twice, matching each firm with a different worker the second time and a giving the firm a new $12 endowment. We chose one of these periods at random for actual payment.
A concern of this study design is that firm profits differ in the two cases where worker payoffs are the same. Before the worker chooses an effort level, the firm has $8 with low wages and good business conditions, while it has $4 with high wages and poor business conditions.
Thus, some of the higher worker effort we see in good business conditions may be due to a principle of rent-sharing coupled with the firm's poorer condition when it pays high wages.
To test the importance of this possibility, we conducted additional sessions with a slightly different design: The payoff to the firm was $2 more when what we call wage conditions were bad (that is, when the firm had to pay the worker $2 less), and the firm paid an additional $2 when these were good. To avoid negative earnings, we increased the firm's endowment by $2 to $14. The new base payoffs were:
Low wage, poor wage conditions Firm has $12, Worker has $2 Low wage, good wage conditions Firm has $8, Worker has $6 High wage, poor wage conditions Firm has $8, Worker has $6 High wage, good wage conditions Firm has $4, Worker has $10 Table 2 shows how the wage conditions and effort levels transformed the base payoffs: 
Hypotheses
Our design provides an array of comparisons across conditions, allowing us to examine a number of predictions by various models of social preferences and to test these in formal hypotheses. While the standard model predicts that the worker always chooses to expend medium effort and firms therefore always choose to pay the low wage, few observers of the experimental literature take this prediction very seriously. We instead use slightly moresophisticated straw men for our initial null hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Worker behavior will not differ across the four interim outcomes. In other words, the distribution of choices (punish, don't sacrifice, reward) will not differ significantly for the wage assigned and in different business or wage conditions.
Hypothesis 1b: Worker behavior will not differ for high and low assigned wages.
All of the social-preference models discussed earlier predict that these hypotheses will fail. For the distributional models, this anticipated failure results from differences in relative payoffs across these interim outcomes, wherever such differences exist. For the kindness-based reciprocity models, worker behavior should be affected by wages (reflecting intention) but should be unaffected by the wage or business condition (distributional concerns). Models that combine intention and distribution predict differences for each condition.
Thus, if perceived kindness affects worker behavior but distributional concerns do not, we should expect:
Hypothesis 2: Worker behavior at either level of assigned wage will not differ across the corresponding wage or business conditions.
On the other hand, if only the available choice set matters to the worker, then we should expect no difference in worker behavior between the low-wage, good-business-condition cell and the high-wage, poor-business-condition cell in Treatment 1, or between the low-wage, goodwage-condition cell and the high-wage, poor-wage-condition cell in Treatment 2. This suggests two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Worker behavior will not differ across the two identical wage outcomes (low wages and good wage conditions versus high wages and poor wage conditions) in either Treatment 1 or Treatment 2.
If workers also care about distribution (but not about the process), then the firm/worker outcome pair is important. In that case, we expect no difference in only the Treatment 2 comparison:
Hypothesis 3b: Worker behavior will not differ across the two identical wage outcomes (low wages and good wage conditions versus high wages and poor wage conditions) in Treatment 2, but may differ in Treatment 1 (low wages and good business conditions versus high wages and poor business conditions).
The details of the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , and Charness and Rabin (2002) models also lead to specific predictions that we do not embed in formal hypotheses. We provide details of these predictions in Appendix C.
Results
We summarize the results for Treatments 1 and 2 in Tables 3 and 4 below. Each Table   shows the number of low and high wages for both poor and good conditions, as well the number of effort responses in each category for the wage and conditions. These data are also aggregated across high and low wages, and poor and good conditions.
In Table 3 , if Hypothesis 1a were true, we should see punishment and reward rates being the same across all combinations of wage and business conditions. Hypothesis 1b suggests that punishment and reward rates are the same for high and low wages, aggregating across business conditions. Hypothesis 2 predicts that while worker behavior may vary by wage, business conditions should not matter for worker responses to either low or high wages. For Hypotheses 3a and 3b, one should compare the rows in bold; Hypothesis 3a indicates that worker responses in these rows should be the same, while Hypothesis 3b allows for differences due to distributional considerations, as per Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Charness and Rabin (2002) . Notes: Medium effort is the omitted category, so % punish + % reward + % medium = 100%. The two bold rows pay identical wages ($6).
The data do not favor either Hypothesis 1a or Hypothesis 1b, as the wage paid by the firm matters substantially. A test of the (punish, don't sacrifice, reward) rates across low and high wages gives c 2 (2) = 26.93, p = 0.001. With low wages, 22 percent of workers punish the firm, while 9 percent reward it. These rates are similar in poor business conditions (25 percent punish; 8 percent reward) and in good business conditions (19 percent punish; 10 percent reward). In contrast, with high wages, 2 percent punish and 47 percent reward. Again, the rates in poor business conditions (3 percent punish, 39 percent reward) and good business conditions (none punish, 60 percent reward) do not differ substantially, although the somewhat higher rate of rewards in good business conditions is marginally significant (Z = 1.49, p = 0.068, one-tailed test). Note the disparity between worker behavior aggregated by low and high wages: the (Punish, Reward) rate was (22%, 9%) with low wages, but (2%, 47%) with high wages.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, good and poor business conditions are not statistically significantly related to effort, although good business conditions result in a bit more high effort and a bit less low effort. Thus, workers in this scenario do not reward managers for workers' good luck. This result is inconsistent with the outcome bias observed in Caplan, Posner, and Cheney (1991) and inconsistent with theories of rent-sharing. We discuss Hypotheses 3a and 3b in more detail later, but note here behavior does appear rather different in the two bold rows.
Given these outcomes, expected firm profits are $7.47 when the firm pays a low wage and $5.91 when the firm pays a high wage. It may be that firms paying a high wage make a mistake, in that they do not know the probabilities of reward and retaliation. It could also be the case that some firms prefer either equality or efficiency, considerations that could make a high wage optimal.
The predictions for Treatment 2 are qualitatively the same as for Treatment 1 for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2. However, the payoff design in Treatment 2 eliminates all distributional differences between the (Low wage, good condition) and (High wage, poor condition) cells, so if intentions don't have any affect, worker behavior in these two circumstances should be unambiguously the same. We summarize the results for Treatment 2 in Table 4 . Compared to Treatment 1, the pattern here is slightly different with respect to conditions:
Good and poor wage conditions are not statistically significantly related to effort when the wage is low. However, the rate of reward is much higher when the wage conditions are good than when they are poor (Z = 3.17, p = 0.001). Recall that a major difference between the two treatments is that here good wage conditions mean bad luck for the firm, whereas in Treatment 1 conditions do not directly affect the firm's payoffs. Thus, when firms pay high wages in this scenario, workers who have had good luck compensate the firms for their bad luck. This result is completely consistent with theories of rent-sharing. On the other hand, negative reciprocity overwhelms this willingness to share when the wage is low; high rates of punishment are nearly identical across wage conditions.
Note that we do not focus on differences in punishment and reward rates across Treatments 1 and 2, since the nature of the subjects in these treatments differs somewhat (business school class vs. regular experimental population) and so comparisons could be confounded. In addition, punishment rates at low wages are definitely higher in Treatment 2;
perhaps a low wage does indeed seem less fair in Treatment 2, where the firm's endowment is $14 rather than $12. Reward rates at high wages are similar when wage conditions are good but are lower when wage conditions are poor. It seems plausible that a worker who has just been unlucky may be less willing to reward a firm that has just had good luck.
Expected firm profits, given these outcomes, are $8.43 when a low wage is paid and $7.05 when a high wage is paid. Here we see that workers impose high punishment rates on the firm for paying them low wages. While it may not be meaningful to compare across treatments (due to the slightly different nature of the participants), it could be that workers perceive a firm's refusal to pay a wage of $8 as less justifiable when the endowment is $14 than when it is $12. In the latter case, the interim (Firm,Worker) payoffs of (4, 8) and (8, 4) show symmetry, so a social planner would have no preference between these allocations. However, the interim payoff of (6, 8) is socially preferred to (10, 4) , since the distribution is less lopsided. Thus, a firm assigning a low wage in Treatment 2 could seem less fair than a firm doing so in Treatment 1.
Regressions
We perform regressions using effort choice as the dependent variable and business/wage condition dummies and race and gender demographics as additional explanatory variables.
These regressions can be found in Appendix B.
Regression 1 is an ordinary least squares regression reflecting the three feasible effort choices; we use robust standard errors to account for the fact that each worker makes two effort choices. It is formally correct to use an ordered logit to take into account that responses are not cardinal; results were very similar when we used that specification. We present the easier-toread OLS specification.
On average, a high wage induces an average effort level 0.626 (or 0.647 when we include demographics) higher a low wage does, and this difference is highly significant.
Poor wage conditions reduce average effort by 0.274 relative to poor business conditions.
Recall that these treatments differ in that the firm benefits from the worker's bad luck with poor wage conditions; thus, workers provide less effort when the firm has received an extra $2. There is no significant difference between efforts with good vs. poor business conditions, so that the workers do not appear to be influenced much by their own luck. However, there is a very significant difference of 0.447 in the average effort provided for good vs. poor wage conditions, so that workers do appear to take luck into account when it affects the firm directly.
None of the race or gender dummies has significant coefficients at the 5% level, although Asian and Hispanic participants provided an average of 0.10 more effort than White participants did.
Regressions 2 and 3 are probit regressions (robust standard errors grouped for two observations per respondent) that respectively consider whether decisions to punish or reward are sensitive to conditions and demographics. (Again, results were very similar with the more flexible but harder-to-read ordered logit.) When a firm chooses a low wage, none of the demographic dummies has significant coefficients. Punishment is slightly more likely with poor wage conditions than with poor business conditions, with marginal statistical significance (p = 0.066, two-tailed test). The coefficients for good business and good wage conditions are very small and nearly identical. On the other hand, workers are much more likely to reward a firm for a high wage when the worker's luck has been good and the firm's poor than when the worker has been unlucky and the firm lucky. In fact, we see a difference across treatments in reward rates with good business vs. good wage conditions, with a worker more willing to reward when the firm has suffered a loss.
Interestingly, the black, Hispanic, and Asian race dummies are significantly different from the white omitted baseline group in Regression 3, implying non-whites reward a high wage somewhat more often than do whites.
Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis 1a says that even if people sacrifice money, the pattern and rate of sacrifice will not depend on wages and business/wage conditions. However, this is clearly not true, and a test of punish, don't sacrifice, and reward distributions across the four cells gives c 2 (6) Let us consider the model-specific predictions mentioned in the previous section and presented in detail in Appendix C. Workers do not tend to reward firms that pay low wages, in accordance with all the models. The substantial rate of low worker effort among those receiving low wages in poor conditions in both treatments is consistent with all the models except for Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . Punishment rates in the low wage cases with poor versus good wage conditions differ very little in the two treatments. This is consistent with the kindnessbased reciprocity models but not with the distributional models. The motivation for low effort seems to stem from considerations of negative intention rather than from unfavorable relative payoffs per se.
With respect to reward behavior among workers receiving high wages in poor wage conditions, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model predicts that the rate of reward in Treatment 1 should be smaller than the punishment rate among those receiving low wages in both good and poor wage conditions. 10 However, the 39 percent reward rate exceeds the 25 percent and 19 percent punishment rates among those receiving low wages in poor or good wage conditions, respectively.
The reward rate does appear to be sensitive to the business or wage conditions, particularly in Treatment 2; the role of relative material payoffs is not consistent with Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) . In Treatment 2, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) predict that no workers receiving high wages in poor wage conditions will choose to expend high effort, and in our experiment only 10 percent choose to reward the firm with high effort. Distributional considerations appear to have more weight when it comes to the choice to provide high effort. In particular, a worker is much more likely to help a firm after receiving a high wage if the worker has also had good luck at the expense of the firm than if the firm has had good luck at the expense of the worker.
Discussion
In the experiments reported above, intentions matter. Employees frequently reward and almost never punish the firm if they perceive good intentions, even when their own outcomes are not particularly good. Employees frequently punish and almost never reward if they perceive bad intentions, even when their own outcomes are not particularly bad.
Because both employer choice and luck matter, two paths can lead to an identical material payoff for workers. This design permits us to cleanly compare the effects of material payoffs and intentions. Employee behavior depends strongly upon the path that leads to the interim outcome. That is, in contrast to most economic theories, intentions matter far more than do material payoffs. In contrast to some important recent fairness theories (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) , intentions matter more than relative payoffs.
These results are thus broadly consistent with models of kindness-based reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998) .
Our results are also consistent with recent experimental findings by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000) . In that experiment, respondents replied to 13 contingent options. Because revenge is often motivated by visceral reactions that are hard to simulate when answering contingent questions, our study design enhances confidence in the importance of revenge. In fact, in some but not all studies (e.g., Brandts and Charness, forthcoming; but not Brandts and Charness, 2000) , punishment rates are much higher when people answer directly, not contingently. (See Hsee, Blount, Loewenstein, and Bazerman, 1999 for a review of withinversus between-subject designs.)
Our findings on intentions' importance are also consistent with the broader literature on procedural justice (Lind and Tyler, 1988) . That is, most people like a system that will on average deliver good outcomes (at least to those who deserve them), even if the outcome is not good in each specific case. A manager who pays a high wage from his or her own pocket clearly tries to deliver a good outcome for the worker; consistent with the literature on procedural justice, we find workers frequently reciprocate in kind.
Our results also emphasize how impression management can affect employees' and customers' responses to bad outcomes (Brockner et al., 1994) . The managerial implication is clear: If outcomes are poor, be sure that you can justify to employees or other stakeholders (such as investors and customers) that the firm tried to do the right thing.
Our results cast doubt on Bolton and Ockenfels's (2000) notion of inequality aversion because this feature predicts no punishment unless it brings the payoff ratios into closer alignment. In contrast, we observe high punishment rates following low wages and poor wage conditions in both treatments.
To test for the effects of distributional concerns, we can compare workers' behavior under different business or wage conditions at each wage level. We find that effort after a low wage does not depend much on distributional considerations. Nevertheless, the pure reciprocity models do not predict that reward behavior in response to a high wage will be sensitive to external conditions. Some degree of rent-sharing exists, particularly in Treatment 2, where favorable wage conditions represent a loss for the firm. Only models that combine distributional concerns with reciprocity motivations can account for the observed patterns of effort chosen by workers.
Limitations and Possible Extensions.
A number of this study's features help highlight the role of intentions. Yet, intentions may have quite different effects in different settings.
In this experiment, intended high wages' failure to translate into actual high wages results explicitly from luck, not effort-the students saw the experimenter flip a coin. People may be less forgiving of failed good intentions if they feel the one with good intentions had low levels of effort or skill. This effect seems particularly likely in situations where norms of reciprocity hold.
To take an extreme case, assume Bob does Alice a favor but does it poorly. At the same time, assume that the favor creates an expectation that in the future, Alice will do a costly favor for Bob. In this extreme case, Bob's initial favor, which might have involved the best of intentions, makes Alice worse off.
The explicit coin flip in our study also makes it easier for workers to assess matters. In the field, people may have a difficult time discerning intentions, given that they often see only
outcomes. An important extension of this research examines repeated interactions where people do not see intentions directly but can identify patterns of outcomes consistent with good or bad intentions.
This signal extraction problem is exacerbated by "hindsight bias" or "outcome bias":
People who observe a poor outcome often assume that the other party is at fault. For example, in one study, doctors reviewed cases with the same facts but with randomly assigned outcomes.
Doctors who rated cases with randomly assigned bad outcomes tended to rate the care as substandard much more than did doctors who rated cases they believed to have a neutral outcome (Caplan, Posner, and Cheney, 1991) . It is plausible, though not yet shown, that people have an outcome bias for estimating intentions as well as care.
Finally, relative payoffs do not have an important role in this study. For example, workers do not consistently share the benefits of good luck with firms. However, good luck may be shared more often in ongoing relationships than in brief lab studies such as this.
APPENDIX A: Instructions
Instructions for The Firm (Treatment 1) You are a firm and have been endowed with $12 from which you pay a wage to a worker with whom you are paired. You may choose to pay a low wage ($4) or a high wage ($8). Whichever wage you choose will be subtracted from your $12 endowment.
The wage you choose is paid to the worker with whom you are paired. However, this wage will randomly be either increased or decreased depending on whether company sales are high or low, with a 50% probability of each condition occurring.
If business conditions are good, then the worker will receive $2 more than you have initially paid, while if business conditions are poor the worker will receive $2 less than you have initially paid. Both good and poor business conditions are equally likely, depending on the flip of a fair coin. Thus, there are four possible outcomes after a coin is flipped to determine whether business conditions are good or poor: Procedure: You choose the wage for the worker with whom you are paired. A coin flip (separate for each worker) then determines whether the business conditions are good or poor. The worker will know the result of this coin flip and the wage you have chosen at the time of his or her choice of effort. The combination of the wage you choose and the effort chosen by the worker will determine the outcome.
We will do this twice, with each firm matched with a different worker the 2 nd time, with a new $12 endowment for the firm. We will then choose one of these periods at random for actually payment. You will be paid individually and privately. Thank you for your participation.
Instructions for the Worker (Treatment 1)
You are a worker and are paired with a firm that has been endowed with $12 from which to pay you a wage. The firm may choose to pay a low wage ($4) or a high wage ($8) . Whichever wage is chosen is subtracted from the firm's $12 endowment.
The amount you receive will be higher or lower than the amount the firm paid, depending on business conditions. Half the time (determined by flipping a fair coin) you will receive $2 more than the firm paid, and half the time you will receive $2 less. Thus, there are four possible outcomes: 
Procedure:
The firm with whom you are paired chooses your wage. A coin flip (separate for each worker) then determines your business conditions. You will know the result of this coin flip and the wage chosen at the time. The combination of the wage chosen by the firm and the effort you choose will determine the outcome.
Instructions for the Firm (Treatment 2)
You are a firm and have been endowed with $14 from which you pay a wage to a worker with whom you are paired. You may choose to pay a low wage ($4) or a high wage ($8) . Whichever wage you choose will be subtracted from your $14 endowment.
The wage you choose will randomly be either increased or decreased depending on external conditions, with a 50% probability of each condition occurring.
If wage conditions are good, then the wage you actually pay the worker will be $2 more than you had initially chosen, while if wage conditions are poor then the wage you actually pay the worker will be $2 less than you had initially chosen. Both good and poor wage conditions are equally likely, depending on the flip of a fair coin. Thus, there are four possible outcomes after a coin is flipped to determine whether wage conditions are good or poor: Procedure: You choose the wage for the worker with whom you are paired. A coin flip (separate for each worker) then determines whether the wage conditions are good or poor. The worker will know the result of this coin flip and the wage you have initially chosen at the time of his or her choice of effort. The combination of the wage paid and the effort chosen by the worker will determine the outcome.
We will do this twice, with each firm matched with a different worker the 2 nd time, with a new $14 endowment for the firm. We will then choose one of these periods at random for actually payment. You will be paid individually and privately. Thank you for your participation.
Instructions for the Worker (Treatment 1)
You are a worker and are paired with a firm that has been endowed with $14 from which to pay you a wage. The firm may choose to pay a low wage ($4) or a high wage ($8). Whichever wage is chosen is subtracted from the firm's $14 endowment.
The amount actually paid will be higher or lower than the amount the firm paid, depending on wage conditions. Half the time (determined by flipping a fair coin) the wage paid will be $2 more than the firm chose initially, and half the time the wage paid will be $2 less. Thus, there are four possible outcomes: 
Procedure:
The firm with whom you are paired chooses your wage. A coin flip (separate for each worker) then determines your wage conditions. You will know the result of this coin flip and the wage initially chosen at the time of your choice of effort. The combination of the wage paid and the effort you choose will determine the outcome. Here a i reflects the extent to which i dislikes being behind, and b i reflects the extent to which i dislikes being ahead. They assume that a i ≥ b i (being behind is at least as painful as being ahead) and b i < 1 (people do not burn their own money just to reach equality).
APPENDIX B: Regression Results
The model's predictions for effort in our context: The Charness and Rabin model includes most of the features of the previous models and also includes a concern for the other party's intentions, as measured by d j . This variable represents the other player's level of demerits, where the higher the value of d j , the less i thinks the other player deserves. Demerits, d j , are allocated when people act selfishly at the expense of efficiency and equity. The utility function that takes into account demerits is:
Utility is a function of own material payoffs (with weight 1-l) and social payoffs (with weight l). Social payoffs, in turn, are an average of concern for the lowest payoff (and in a two-player game, this parameter also captures equality) with weight d and concern for efficiency with weight 1-d. The weights l and d range between 0 and 1, inclusive. The non-negative parameter f captures a player's taste for punishing miscreants. The non-negative parameters b and k capture the notion that low payments to miscreants do not provide as much disutility as low payments to well-behaving others. High effort if l(3 -4d) > 1, otherwise medium effort High, Good Same as Treatment 1 Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) The Rabin (1993) model was developed for normal-form games, while the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) model involves sequential games. Although these are different models, we present (for expository purposes) only a highly simplified version of these models, as they make identical predictions in our context. The full models require considerable notation and development. We have:
where g I reflects the degree to which player i cares about reciprocity considerations, k ij is the kindness of player i towards player j, and l iji is player i's belief about the kindness of player j toward player i. Thus, if player i believes that player j is being unkind (negative value of l iji ), negative kindness toward player j will increase player i's utility. On the other hand, if player i believes that player j is being kind (positive value of l iji ), positive kindness toward player j will increase player i's utility.
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Note that there is no mention of payoff distribution between the players.
The models' predictions for effort in our context: 
